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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Cultural Compatibility: Economic  
 
Development in Eastern Europe 
 
 
by 
 
 
Daniel Brilliant, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2011 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Diana Thomas 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 
Recent work in the field of development economics has demonstrated a 
correlation between certain cultural traits and economic prosperity, reinforcing the theory 
of institutional stickiness.  Notable works have served to quantify and clarify the 
connection between informal cultural institutions and formal governmental institutions.  
Due to a lack of data, however, studies which examine the link between culture and 
prosperity have omitted former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe from their data sets.  
With the availability of new data, analysis for this region has now become possible, 
yielding surprising insights into the sources of economic development.  This paper 
demonstrates that the cultural indicators established in the literature do not have quite the 
same economic impact on former Soviet countries as on other countries of the world, 
suggesting that different factors are driving the success or failure of these transitioning 
economies. 
(43 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
Cultural Compatibility: Economic Development in Eastern Europe 
 
 
 The objective of Daniel Brilliant’s research is to explore the relationship between 
culture and economic prosperity in the former communist countries of Eastern 
Europe.  Learning why some of these countries do better than others is of interest in 
discovering what causes a country’s economy to grow in general.  Knowing the causes of 
economic growth helps in determining what policies, if any, can be adopted by a country 
to help promote economic growth.  Some have theorized that government policies are at 
the heart of prosperity.  Others have speculated that cultural factors play a large role in 
determining if such policies will be effective.   
This study expands upon research performed in the development economics 
literature by adding data from countries which have been historically excluded.  Earlier 
studies usually omitted these transitioning economies due to a lack of available data, but 
as time goes on data becomes more and more accessible.  The major contribution of this 
paper in terms of data collection is the incorporation of measures used to gauge judicial 
power from the social sciences literature to fill gaps in the economics literature data. 
The analysis suggests that certain cultural measures which are used in 
development economics literature are not significant contributors to the divergence in 
economic outcomes in Eastern Europe.  In light of this, future research should look to 
other sources to understand what drives economic prosperity in Eastern Europe and 
perhaps in the world at large.  
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The term “Washington Consensus,” coined by John Williamson of the Institute for 
International Economics in 1989, depicts a set of ten policy prescriptions for developing 
countries to improve their economy.  These policies were a conglomeration of the policy 
advice of major international and Washington based organizations.  The original intention 
of this position was to help developing countries in Latin America escape grinding 
poverty.  It is only natural that when the Soviet Union fell, Washington Consensus policy 
initiatives, prominent in the world of development economics at the time, would be 
applied to the newly founded countries of Eastern Europe.  The popular phrase of the 
time was “getting the institutions right,” (Williamson, 2009) signifying the idea that it 
was most important to formulate an appropriate mix of formal governmental rules in 
order to create a vibrant free market economy.  The results of these attempts surprised 
many experts.  The transition from a controlled socialist economy to a liberalized system 
was difficult for each nation.   
Results thus far have varied greatly between countries.  For example Poland grew 
from a GDP per capita of $3,097 in 1990, measured in constant 2000 USD, to $6,570 in 
2010, more than doubling in twenty years.  Russia, on the other hand, grew from $2,602 
in 1990 to only $2,923 in 2010. (World Bank)  Although they have all been experiencing 
generally positive growth for the last two decades, they are all increasing at very different 
rates.  What could explain this difference?   
The developmental transition of these formerly socialist economies is of great interest 
in understanding the determinants of economic development in the rest of the world.  
2 
Since the former soviet countries were all subjected to similar command and control 
economic systems which ensured similar outcomes in terms of GDP per capita and 
standard of living, it is important to determine how the different institutional structures 
which have been adopted by each nation since the fall of the Soviet Union have impacted 
their divergent development.  Much of the research in development economics has 
neglected extensive review of the former Soviet bloc countries due to a lack of reliable 
data.  Now that new data sources have emerged study of this region has become possible.   
In part due to the mixed results of the Washington Consensus reforms, a new theory 
has emerged in the field of development economics which describes how tension between 
formal institutions and informal institutions determines how well a set of policies will be 
received.  Boettke, et al (2008) lays out the theory of “institutional stickiness” which 
states that how effective formal government policies are going to be is determined in a 
large part by the compatibility of those constraints with local informal rules and customs.  
Formal institutions are considered to be exogenous while informal institutions are 
endogenous, spontaneous and self-organizing.  When formal institutions run counter to 
local informal institutions, inefficiencies are created and the potential for unrest emerges.  
Even when formal institutions attempt to replace informal institutions while achieving the 
same ends (such as encoding into law a rule which is already a social norm) there can be 
inefficiencies due to misallocations by the government as well.   
An extension of this theory supported by Williamson (2009) is that the most 
economically developed countries are associated with strong informal cultural rules 
which are conducive to economic growth, such as a trust of others.  On the other hand 
strong formal rules which constrain the power of the government, and thus should be 
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useful in limiting arbitrary and economically detrimental policies, are actually associated 
with lower economic development.  She suggests that the mismatch of formal and 
informal institutions is not as important for development as the actual strength of the 
institutions themselves.  Informal institutions simply trump formal institutions, better 
constraining behavior in a way that benefits development.  This theory of institutional 
stickiness is central to the methods used in my analysis, particularly the additional 
insights provided by Williamson (2009). 
This paper seeks to address how informal institutions, measured by certain aspects of 
culture (which represent informal institutions) as described by Tabellini (2010), interact 
with formal institutions  in transitional countries, in order to see what impact this 
interaction has on economic development.   I find that these post-communist countries do 
not follow the same patterns found in the rest of the world, as reported by Williamson 
(2009), and that the cultural traits described by Tabellini are not significant in explaining 
the variations in economic wellbeing present in this region of the world.  This suggests 
that there are other forces at work which have a more significant impact on economic 
outcomes and that more research is required to discover what those forces are. 
  
4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
One strand of the literature in the field of development economics explains the mixed 
results of the Washington Consensus efforts with the theory of institutional stickiness as 
described by Boettke, et al (2008). This theory postulates a vital connection between the 
informal institutions of a host country and the formal institutions.  Specifically, the theory 
posits that if the formal institutions run counter to the informal institutions then the 
formal policies will be less likely to take hold or be effective.  The theory also allows that 
formal institutions can affect informal institutions but that this process is slow. 
Works such as Tabellini (2010) and Williamson (2009) expand upon this theory of 
institutional stickiness and seek to flesh out and quantify the nature of the connection 
between informal and formal institutions.  Tabellini's measures of culture, which consist 
of segments of the World Value Survey: Inglehart et al (2000), are correlated with 
economic prosperity, controlling for a series of other important indicators.   His work 
suggests that there is a causal relationship from culture to annual per capita GDP in the 
regions of Western Europe. This work provides the measures used for informal 
institutions in subsequent papers such as Williamson (2009) and this paper. It also 
establishes a list of four specific cultural traits which are correlated with economic 
prosperity. There are three indicators he uses which are positively correlated with GDP 
per capita: trust of others, a sense of control over one's life, and the importance of 
teaching respect and tolerance of others to children. There is also one variable used which 
is negatively correlated, the importance of teaching obedience to children. 
Williamson (2009) takes data from a broader set of countries than Tabellini 
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(2010).  Her results suggest that certain arrangements of informal and formal institutions 
are better for economic performance than others.  Specifically, the average performance 
was highest for those countries which had well developed informal institutions. Also, 
strong formal institutions had a negative effect, both for those countries with weak and 
strong informal institutions. These results show that the formalization of informal rules 
can be detrimental to economic development and that informal institutions are better at 
inducing economically beneficial behavior. 
As a guide for how to measure formal institutions I follow Glaeser, La Porta, Lopees-
De-Silanes, & Shleifer (2004).  They posit that in order to truly measure institutions, as 
defined by North (1981), many of the more commonly used institutional metrics in the 
development economics literature are not adequate. Since they are constructed using de 
facto outcomes, not de jure rules, they are biased by short term events, such as election 
results and the capricious but economically beneficial policies of dictators which are not 
necessarily reflective of more sustained institutional trends and constraints. 
For the measurement of formal institutions I also defer to La Porta, López-de-Silanes, 
Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer (2004), who establish the importance of judicial independence 
and constitutional review as institutional indicators of economic prosperity. Their data 
has since been widely used in the literature. Because their indicators were based on data 
available in 1995, they overlook countries in Eastern Europe which were considered 
transitional at the time. Due to this gap in the data I look to works in the political science 
literature for a suitable proxy, specifically Smithey & Ishiyama (2000). 
The indicators used in Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) were used to construct a 
dependent variable in order to determine the factors which affect judicial formation in 
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post-socialist countries. The variables that they use for determining judicial power 
combine measures of judicial independence and constitutional review. These variables are 
constructed very similarly to those in La Porta, et al (2004) in that they are de jure 
measures based on constitutional provisions. Though they do not measure exactly the 
same aspects of each country's constitution, they are close enough that a reasonable 
comparison can be made. 
Another work from the social sciences literature, Johnson & Berrett (2011), which 
lays out a practical framework for strategic cultural analysis for the intelligence 
community, suggests that the relationship between culture and institutions may be too 
complicated to be sufficiently described quantitatively.  The results of this paper coincide 
with this idea, and there are likely other cultural factors which have a strong impact on 
economic outcomes.  Indeed the same cultural traits which create a positive environment 
for growth in one region may not have the same effect in another region.  The cultural 
measures employed in Tabellini (2010) only measure certain norms among the 
population, and neglect other important factors.  For example, there may be a cultural 
norm that places a taboo on ambition or the accumulation of profit.  Similarly there may 
be a perceptual lens that labels any western institution or business as untrustworthy, 
damaging the potential for foreign trade.  These sorts of issues are not sufficiently 
addressed by current metrics of informal institutions present in the literature.  As the 
findings of this paper suggest, future endeavors would be benefited by looking at the 
broader spectrum of cultural indicators present in the social sciences literature to measure 
informal institutions. 
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DATA 
The nineteen countries in my data set are not present in the related literature, so it is 
worth explicitly mentioning them.  They include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  All of these 
countries are conspicuous for having been subject to a relatively uniform centrally 
planned socialist economic system for several decades.  The notable exception is 
Slovenia, which enjoyed a comparatively high degree of economic autonomy and was 
exempt from many of the rules which governed other nations in this sample.  Due to this 
outlier effect, Slovenia is excluded from some portions of my analytical work so that 
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of institutional change in the aftermath of a 
planned economy.  The general results, however, remain unchanged with or without 
Slovenia.  Since the data for Slovenia may be of use in future works by others, it is 
included in table 3 of appendix A along with my complete data set.  The associated 
descriptive statistics are located in table 2 of the same appendix. 
The method for quantifying formal and informal institutions in this paper follows 
those used in Williamson (2009).  Formal institutions are measured using four indicators 
recommended by Glaeser, et al (2004),
1
 since they measure legal constraints and are not 
bias by short run outcomes.  The Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
2
 provides the 
information for proportional representation and plurality.  Both of these are dummy 
                                                 
1
 These include plurality, proportional representation, constitutional review and judicial independence. 
2
 Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh (2001) 
3
The 2004 referendum was focused on the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and executive constraints, 
not legislative ones. 
 
4
 Waves included are 1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009. 
5
 Specifically it measures whether the partial correlations among variables are small. 
2
 Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh (2001) 
8 
variables where 1 represents the presence of the trait in question and 0 its absence.  In the 
case of plurality, this measures the presence of a “winner takes all” election system.  A 
country is considered to have proportional representation if candidates are elected based 
on the percent of votes received by their party.  The variables proportional representation 
and plurality are created by averaging the scores for each country from 1996 to 2009.  
Since these are measures of constitutional provisions they aren't likely to change over 
time.  There are, however, some notable exceptions.  In the case of Latvia, Poland and 
Romania, which joined the European Union in 2007, their governmental structure was 
changed the year that they obtained membership.  Russia, Ukraine and Macedonia also 
changed their constitutions during the sample period.  In the case of Ukraine the scores 
reflect the ratification of the Ukrainian constitution in 1996 and the major reforms 
implemented by Victor Yanukovich in 2004.  For Russia, these changing scores are the 
result of political reforms during the Putin presidency.   Macedonia’s scores for these 
variables changed due to laws passed in 2004-2005 which changed the political landscape 
as part of a power sharing agreement.  In one case, Belarus, there was a section of years 
for which data was not available from 1998-2004.  Since the numbers remain the same 
for the period before the gap as after, and since there were no notable changes regarding 
the variables of interest in the constitution of Belarus during this time 
3
 the average is 
simply taken using the available data, excluding the missing years. 
The data used in the literature for constitutional review and judicial independence 
were generated by La Porta, et al (2004) using de jure measures present in each country's 
                                                 
3
The 2004 referendum was focused on the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and executive constraints, 
not legislative ones. 
 
9 
constitution. Since their data set excludes the countries of Eastern Europe, an alternative 
source is used to construct these variables.  Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) employs a series 
of six de jure measures of various aspects of judicial power in their analysis.  The first 
two (as well as another indicator which is used as an independent variable in their paper) 
encompass aspects of constitutional review powers granted to the judiciary, the average 
of which constitutes my variable constitutional review.  The remaining four address 
judicial independence and the average of their measures make up my variable judicial 
review.  For a more detailed explanation of how these variables are constructed and how 
they compare to those used in La Porta, et al (2004) see Appendix B.  All four formal 
constraints represent constitutional measures designed to constrain government, and, 
therefore, higher scores imply stronger formal institutions. 
Informal institutions are measured using the method laid out by Tabellini (2010) 
which uses four measures from the World Values Survey, Inglehart, et al (2009).
4
 The 
first of these measures is the percentage of respondents which answered the question 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?” with the response “Most people can be trusted.” The 
other possible response was, “You can never be too careful.” This variable is called trust. 
The second and third variables are constructed from the question “Here is a list of 
qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider 
to be especially important?  Please choose up to five.”  The potential responses include: 
tolerance and respect for others, leadership, self-control, thrift, determination, religious 
faith, unselfishness, obedience, and loyalty. The percentage of respondents which 
                                                 
4
 Waves included are 1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009. 
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included tolerance and respect for others in their answer is coded as tolerance. The 
percentage of respondents which included obedience in their answer is coded as 
obedience.  
The final metric is derived from the question “Some people feel they have completely 
free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no 
real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means 
“none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control in life you have over the way your life turns out.” The variable control is the 
unweighted average of the responses from each country. Trust, Respect, and Control, 
according to the prevailing theory present in the literature, should be positively correlated 
with economic performance. Obedience is meant to be negatively correlated with 
economic performance. 
From the four measures for formal institutions a composite indicator is constructed 
using an unconditional average.  An identical approach is used to create a composite 
score for informal institutions.  Williamson (2009) employs principal component analysis 
to derive these composite indicators, but this method appears to be inappropriate for my 
data set.  The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity indicate that factor analysis is not well suited for construction of either 
composite variable.  Specifically, the KMO test measures the sampling adequacy.
5
  As a 
rule of thumb, test results should be greater than 0.5 for factor analysis to be productive.  
For both variable sets, however, the KMO test result was less than 0.5, thus satisfactory 
analysis is in question. 
                                                 
5
 Specifically it measures whether the partial correlations among variables are small. 
11 
Bartlett's test of sphericity indicates the level of certainty that the correlation matrix is 
an identity matrix, which determines if the factor model is appropriate.  If the test result is 
significant (i.e. <0.05) then the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity 
matrix can be rejected, which implies that the factor model is appropriate.  If the test is 
not significant (i.e. >0.05) then the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix cannot be rejected, implying that the factor model is not appropriate.  The 
formal institution composite indicator failed this test as well.  Thus I resort to simple 
averaging, as used by La Porta, et al (2004), Smithey & Ishiyama (2000), and Tabellini 
(2010) in variable construction.   
  
12 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
To determine the nature of the relationship between formal and informal institutions a 
simple OLS regression is performed using the following specification: 
Y = α+βX + u 
In this equation Y is the vector of formal institution composite scores, X equals the 
vector of informal institution composite scores, and u is an independent and identically 
distributed error term. A positive relationship between X and Y suggests that informal 
and formal institutions are complementary. A negative relationship, however, lends 
strength to the idea that there are frictions created when formal constraints displace  
informal ones. As indicated in figure 1, there is a clear negative relationship. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of formal and informal institutional measures. 
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Figure 2a:  Williamson (2009) grid.      Figure 2b:  Quadrant analysis grid. 
Composite Analysis 
In order to better flesh out the relationship between formal and informal institutions, 
each country is plotted in a chart.  Williamson (2009) employs a three by three grid to 
separate the countries by relative institutional scores as shown in figure 2a. Williamson 
designated those countries with an institution composite score above six as “strong” and 
those below three as “weak.” Since all of the countries in my sample have a composite 
informal institution score between three and six, this method does little to demonstrate 
the relative effects of informal institutional structures in this case. Therefore, I use a 
quadrant system to compare relative institutional strengths as shown in figure 2b.  The 
median is used as the point of demarcation between quadrants due to the relative lack of 
variability in the data set. Countries with a formal institution score above the median 
appear in the northern sectors; countries with an informal institution score above the 
median appear in the western sectors. This method is justified for two reasons.  First, the 
14 
criteria by which the strength of a set of institutions is determined are arbitrary.  Second, 
the composite score is unit-less and only useful for relative comparisons.  
The average GDP per capita is then taken for the countries in each quadrant, which 
allows a general comparison of the relative level of prosperity as it relates to the strength 
of their institutions.  GDP per capita is measured in constant 2005 USD adjusted for 
purchasing power parity for the year 2010.   Figure 3 shows the countries and the average 
2010 GDP per capita for each quadrant.  In these figures, cells are shaded to make 
analysis easier. Darker cells have a higher GDP per capita; lighter cells have a lower 
GDP per capita.  As mentioned before, Slovenia is excluded from the averages due to the 
autonomy which it enjoyed during the Soviet period.  For reference, figure 4 is a 
reproduction of the results found in Williamson (2009).  In order to compare these results 
it is again important to point out that the four sectors present in the reproduction figure 
from Williamson (2009) represent the four corners of a nine sector grid.  Though our 
methods differ enough that a direct comparison is not appropriate, the general direction of  
the results are notably distinctive. 
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 resulting average GDP per capita, reproduced from Williamson, (2009). 
  
 
These results are close to those of Williamson (2009), but with one prominent 
exception.  Williamson finds that countries with strong informal institutions are the 
leaders in economic performance.  For any given level of informal constraints, a higher 
formal institution composite score had a negative effect.  Thus, the best performing sector 
is the Northeast one, representing strong informal and weak formal institutions.  This is 
followed closely by the Northwest sector (strong formal and strong informal institutions) 
and then less closely by the Southeast sector (weak formal and weak informal 
institutions) and the Southwest sector (weak formal and strong formal institutions).  Her 
results indicate that there are frictions created by formalizing informal constraints and 
that informal constraints are a much better way to ensure economic prosperity. 
In my analysis, however, on average the two strongest performing quadrants are 
the Northeast (weak formal and strong informal institutions) and Southwest (weak 
informal and strong informal institutions) quadrants.  This would imply that the mismatch 
of institutional strengths is indeed beneficial.  This could mean that informal and formal 
institutions are fair substitutes for each other.  When both are strong there are 
16 
inefficiencies due to conflicting institutions.  When both are weak, performance suffers 
even more due to a lack of institutional support. 
Also, the difference between average GDP per capita scores for each quadrant is 
much smaller than in Williamson (2009), with the top quadrant only outperforming the 
lowest by about three percent.  This is not surprising since all of the countries in this 
sample are far more similar than those in Williamson (2009). 
It is worth pointing out that the sector which had the greatest variability of GDP 
per capita in Williamson’s analysis was the mid-informal, strong formal sector.  This 
cohort included some of the richest and poorest countries of all.  If a comparison is to be 
made using Williamson’s metrics and those in this paper, half of the nations in my data 
set fall into this volatile category.  About the countries which lie in this range Williamson 
said: 
This category {mid informal, strong formal} suggests that an institutional arrangement can 
promote economic progress in one country but not in another, making it difficult to predict 
success.  
 
Indeed, this seems to be the case with the countries examined in this paper.  This sort of 
ambiguity only serves to highlight the need for more research into this area.  It may also 
be possible that in this region the four cultural traits defined by Tabellini have a 
distinctly different effect than they do in other regions.   
Component Analysis 
To further explore this result, each measure of culture is examined separately to 
better determine how each variable affects the result.  The average culture score has 
17 
surprisingly low variability, but it is not due to a lack of variation for any given 
component variable. Indeed figure 5,
6
  figure 6,
7
 and figures 7-10
8
 show that this 
particular set of variables happen to cancel out each other's effects in such a way as to put 
the averages in a small range close to the mean. Comparison of each culture 
 
 
Figure 5: The relationship between culture measures for each country. 
 
 
 Tolerance Obedience Trust Control 
Tolerance 1.000 0.424 0.063 0.013 
Obedience 0.424 1.000 -0.080 0.243 
Trust 0.063 -0.080 1.000 -0.744 
Control 0.013 0.243 -0.744 1.000 
Figure 6: The correlation matrix of the informal institution measures. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Figure 5 - a graph showing the relationship of the four culture measures for each country, demonstrating 
that each country has very different component scores which tend to cancel each other’s variance.  This 
pulls the composite score closer to the mean. 
7
 Figure 6 - the correlation matrix of the culture variables. This reinforces the information found in figure 5. 
8
 Figures 7-10 - a series of scatter plots which show the relationship between each culture measure and the 
formal institution composite score.  Each scatterplot demonstrates far greater variability for the scores of 
each component culture measure than is present in the composite variable.  Compare to figure 1. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of formal institutions and tolerance. 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of formal institutions and trust. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of formal institutions and obedience. 
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Figure 10: Comparison of formal institutions and control. 
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measure to the formal institution score reveals that each variable has a different, 
sometimes countervailing effect.  Figures 11-14 show the quadrant based analysis for 
each informal institution measure, one at a time. 
These results suggest that there are other exogenous forces, beyond this model's 
specification, which modify the effect of each variable, effectively changing the impact 
of each cultural trait. Tabellini's work focuses on Western Europe, where the 
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cultural traits which he designates have the effect which he lays out. My results suggest 
that in different cultural contexts, the same cultural traits might not have the same effect 
on economic performance. 
While the variables tolerance and obedience follow the same pattern as is present 
in the composite analysis, the other variables, trust and control, both follow their own 
sequence.  This indicates that a strong informal ethic of tolerance and respect for others 
benefits economic performance when formal institutions are weak.   In the absence of 
strong informal tolerance, formal institutions benefit development.   
Obedience, according to Tabellini (2010), negatively correlated with economic 
prosperity, but those quadrants with a strong obedience score outperform those with a 
weak score on average.  In Tabellini (2010) obedience was used as a proxy for the degree 
of hierarchy in society.  According to his theory, the more hierarchical a society, the less 
prosperous it was likely to be.  Using this interpretation, more hierarchical societies 
perform better when constraints on government are weaker.  Less hierarchical societies 
do better when there are more constraints on government.  This result seems to accord 
with the idea that when cultural traits mismatch institutions there are losses due to 
frictions, but when they coincide, there are benefits.  A hierarchical society would tend to 
do well when the hierarchy is codified into law, whereas a more horizontally integrated 
society does better with a more constrained government and greater flexibility to self-
organize.  
The results for trust suggest that trust for others has a positive impact on 
prosperity, but that the relationship with formal institutions is more nuanced than with 
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tolerance.  It would appear that countries whose citizens possess a strong sense of trust 
for others benefit more from strong formal institutions, while those nations whose 
citizens do not trust others do not derive such a benefit from strong formal constraints.  It 
is possible that citizens of those countries with strong formal institutions find it easier to 
prosper thanks to the constraints on government which help prevent cronyism.  Whereas 
those who trust others less tend to do better in an environment where there are fewer 
constraints on the government and interactions with others are more likely to be 
constrained by the state.  This result seems quite counter intuitive unless one is familiar 
with some of the cultures and governments in this region of the world. 
In the case of control the results are polarized in the opposite direction from trust 
and obedience.  Countries with citizens who have a strong sense of control over their 
lives perform best in a system with strong formal constraints on government, since such a 
system tends to help remove formal barriers to entrepreneurism.  For those citizens who 
feel they have little control over their lives, a system with fewer checks on government  
power is more beneficial.   
Robustness Checks 
Due to the relatively simple nature of this analysis, and following Williamson’s 
methods, I perform a series of robustness checks.  First, a new variable is created which 
is the ratio of formal and informal scores. A score less than one implies stronger formal 
institutions relative to informal.  A score greater than one suggests the opposite is true.  
This new variable is then regressed on GDP per capita to demonstrate the relationship 
between formalization of society and economic performance.  Figure 15 shows, in 
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accordance with the findings of Williamson (2009), a negative relationship.  This 
suggests that as formal institutions displace informal ones, there are losses due to  
inefficiency. 
 
Figure 15: Relative institutional strength and economic performance. 
Next, several OLS specifications are run to check robustness which are 
represented in table 1.  The log of GDP per capita in 2010 is regressed on the formal 
composite index, the informal index, the ratio variable, an interaction term,
9
  and a vector 
of control variables.  These variables include: the average growth in GDP from 1991-
2010, the percentage of urbanized population in 2010,
10
 inequality,
11
 government 
consumption,
12
 the corruption perception score from transparency international’s 2010 
rankings, geography as measured by the log of the distance from the capital to 
                                                 
9
 The interaction term consists of the formal score multiplied by the informal score. 
10
 Data for urbanization is gathered from the World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
11
 Inequality is proxied by the GINI coefficient of income inequality for 2010 and retrieved from the World 
Bank: World Development Indicators. 
12
 Government consumption measures are gathered from the 2008 Fraser Institute index, Gwartney, Hall, & 
Lawson (2008). 
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Copenhagen, Denmark,
13
 and average years of schooling in 1960 as estimated by Barro 
& Lee, (2010).   Williamson had included a dummy variable for English legal origin as 
well, but since none of the countries in my sample derived their legal system from the 
common law tradition this variable is omitted.   The composite scores used to measure 
formal and informal institutions are only meant to be used as relative measures of 
institutional strength.  Since there is no common unit of measure only the ordinal 
relationship is of any significance.  The coefficients are therefore not to be interpreted as 
representing marginal effects; only the signs and significance levels are of interest. 
Column [1] only controls for formal institutions and shows that formal institutions 
are negatively correlated with GDP per capita.  The relationship, however, is not 
significant.  Column [2] only controls for informal institutions and is positively correlated 
but also not significant.  Column [3] controls for both formal and informal indices.  Both 
retain the same relationship with GDP per capita, and neither is significant.  Column [4] 
introduces a vector of control variables.  None of the institutional measures emerge as 
significant.  Columns [5] and [6] control for the interaction term, with column [6] 
including a vector of controls.  In columns [7] and [8] the ratio term is regressed, both 
with and without controls.  Columns [9] and [10] breakout the component cultural 
measures to see if each measure individually has any significance in predicting GDP per 
capita performance.  It is interesting to point out that the signs in column [9] correspond 
with the directions laid out by Tabellini (2010), but when the controls are introduced in 
[10] the signs change.  This supports the idea that other regional factors might change 
                                                 
13
 This measure of geography controls for both the latitudinal effects, which are well established in the 
literature, but also for the beneficial historical and geographic effects of proximity to more developed 
western nations which is unique to this region.  Copenhagen, Denmark represents a point to the northwest, 
the farther from which a country is, the lower its GDP per capita. 
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Table 1: GDP Regressions 
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita 2010 adjusted for PPP (in constant 2005 dollars) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Formal institutions 
-0.027   -0.018 0.017 0.046 -0.093 
(0.039)  (0.040) (0.045) (0.574) (0.763) 
Informal institutions  
0.178 0.164 -0.007 0.249 -0.167 
 (0.149) (0.156) (0.211) (0.779) (1.128) 
Ratio formal/informal       
      
Interaction 
formal/informal 
    -0.014 0.025 
    (0.129) (0.170) 
Tolerance    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Obedience    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Trust    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Control    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Growth    
-0.007  0.003 
   (0.068)  (0.099) 
Urban Population    
-0.007  -0.006 
   (0.011)  (0.014) 
Inequality    
0.016  0.015 
   (0.018)  (0.025) 
Government 
consumption 
   -0.000  -0.000 
   (0.012)  (0.014) 
Corruption    
0.026 
 
0.031 
   
(0.068) 
 
(0.083) 
Geography    
-0.905 
 
-0.874 
   
(0.602) 
 
(0.705) 
Education    
0.070 
 
0.057 
   
(0.083) 
 
(0.128) 
Coefficient 
4.220*** 3.278*** 3.453*** 6.173* 3.071 6.844 
(0.251) (0.649) (0.772) (1.731) (3.509) (5.004) 
Observations 19 19 19 15 19 15 
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.73 0.09 0.74 
Adj. R-squared -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.25 -0.09 0.07 
 
      Standard errors are in parentheses.   
    Significance level:  *** at 0.1%;  ** at 1%; * at 5%; ~ at 10% 
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Table 1: GDP Regressions (continued) 
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita 2010 adjusted for PPP (in constant 2005 dollars) 
  [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Formal institutions 
    
  
  
  
Informal institutions   
  
  
  
Ratio formal/informal 
-0.150 0.066 
  (0.150) (0.132) 
  
Interaction formal/informal   
  
  
  
Tolerance  
 
0.007 -0.003 
 
 
(1.143) (0.009) 
Obedience  
 
-0.003 0.014 
 
 
(0.010) (0.012) 
Trust  
 
0.012 -0.008 
 
 
(0.012) (0.021) 
Control  
 
0.015 0.027 
 
 
(0.014) (0.028) 
Growth  
-0.006 
 
-0.032 
 (0.059) 
 
(0.081) 
Urban Population  
-0.007 
 
0.004 
 (0.007) 
 
(0.013) 
Inequality  
0.016 
 
0.023 
 (0.013) 
 
(0.018) 
Government consumption  
0.000 
 
-0.008 
 (0.011) 
 
(0.015) 
Corruption  
0.028 
 
0.058 
 (0.058) 
 
(0.091) 
Geography  
-0.882~ 
 
-0.749 
 (0.446) 
 
(0.470) 
Education  
0.068 
 
0.068 
 (0.064) 
 
(0.078) 
Coefficient 
4.271*** 6.073** 2.488* 3.279 
(0.226) (1.532) (1.143) (3.000) 
Observations 19 15 19 15 
R-squared 0.06 0.73 0.13 0.84 
Adj. R-squared -0.00 0.38 -0.11 0.26 
 
    Standard errors are in parentheses.   
  Significance level:  *** at 0.1%;  ** at 1%; * at 5%; ~ at 10% 
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 the innate effect of these cultural traits on economic performance. 
Clearly the formal and informal composite scores are not significant in explaining 
variations in GDP per capita.  Despite the information which the quadrant analysis 
provides about the association of the various cultural measures and formal institutions, it 
is clear that the relationships are not helpful in explaining the divergent economic 
development in Eastern Europe.  Since neither the composite scores for either cultural 
indicators or formal institutions nor the interaction term are significant, I conclude that 
there are other factors which explain the difference in outcomes among these 
transitioning nations. 
The final robustness check that Williamson performs is to examine the average 
GDP per capita for the countries which lie in between her strong and weak boundaries to 
see if they follow the same general trend as those in the extreme sectors.  This check is 
not relevant to my analysis since this paper uses quadrants to subdivide the cohorts 
according to institutional strength.   
 
  
28 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of the quadrant analysis suggest that in Eastern Europe the cultural 
aspects measured in this paper have a different effect than in the world at large.  
Expanding those results to examine each culture measure reveals that the interplay 
between informal and formal institutions is much more nuanced than they appear to be on 
the surface.  Unfortunately, though some relative comparisons can be made regarding the 
effectiveness of one institutional arrangement over another, the lack of statistical 
significance in any of the robustness specifications implies that relative institutional 
relationships are not significant in explaining the divergent economic development in 
Eastern Europe. 
There may be value in performing a more nuanced cultural analysis, taking into 
account the specific regional complexities of Eastern Europe, but then any cross cultural 
analysis becomes difficult.  My results suggest that in different cultural contexts, the 
same cultural traits might not have the same effect on economic performance, further 
complicating any transnational comparison. 
There are likely other factors which are of greater importance than the cultural 
measures used by Tabellini (2010) in determining the success of a transitioning economy.  
Further research is required to determine what these factors are and how transitional 
economies evolve.  Many of the former communist states still have legacies of the Soviet 
Union present in their institutional composition.  For instance, command and control 
economic planning generated inefficient allocations of human and physical capital, which 
in turn had an impact on the informal institutions in the region.  A well-documented 
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example is the thriving black market in the Soviet Union generated by the tight regulation 
of commodities markets.  A set of informal institutions evolved in order to regulate the 
barter of goods and favors which remained even after the formal regulation of goods was 
discontinued.  These legacy institutions are not accurately reflected in the formal 
institutional measures used in this paper and may have a significant impact on 
productivity depending on the other informal institutions in the region.   
For some of the sample countries similar formal and informal institutional 
arrangements seem to generate highly variable outcomes, suggesting that there is much 
more at play here.  This is further supported by the fact that nations with a similar 
institutional mix to those in my sample had a much higher variance of outcomes in GDP 
per capita than other nations in the world according to Williamson (2009).  This variance 
might be symptomatic of this particular institutional structure. 
With all this complexity it is little wonder that the idea of simply “getting the 
institutions right” would have such a widely variable success rate.    These sorts of 
interactions must be studied in greater depth if any conclusions are to be made regarding 
why these transitional economies are defying consensus when it comes to the 
determinants of economic growth. 
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APPENDIX A.  DATA 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum 
2010 GDP pc ppp in const 2005 dollars 
12984.126 2789.438 24982.474 
log 2010 GDP pc ppp in const 2005 
dollars 4.054 3.446 4.398 
Tolerance 
60.670 40.467 74.157 
Obedience 
26.500 13.467 38.952 
Trust 
23.582 12.121 43.920 
Control 
63.238 40.838 72.707 
Plurality 
0.508 0.000 1.000 
Proportional Representation 
60.670 40.467 74.157 
Constitutional Review 
26.500 13.467 38.952 
Judicial Independence 
23.582 12.121 43.920 
Cultural Composite Score 
63.238 40.838 72.707 
Formal Composite Score 
0.508 0.000 1.000 
Ratio of Formal and Informal Scores 
0.914 0.000 1.000 
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Table 3: Master Data Table 
 
  
Country
2010 GDP pc ppp 
in const 2005 
dollars
log 2010 GDP pc 
ppp in const 2005 
dollars
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APPENDIX B.  DATA DESCRIPTIONS FROM SMITHEY & ISHIYAMA (2000) 
 
 
Table 4: Conversions of Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) Variables 
Composite 
Variable 
Source 
Variable 
Data Description 
Constitutional 
Review 
Can judicial 
decision be 
overturned 
Answers the question, “Can the judicial body 
responsible for determining constitutionality have 
its decisions overturned by other actors?” and is 
coded as 0 if the court’s decisions can be 
overturned and 1 if not. 
Constitutional 
Review 
Presence of a 
priori review 
Measures the extent of a priori review by the 
judiciary, namely can the judiciary challenge the 
constitutionality of statutes before they are applied.  
If the judiciary has broad a priori review then that 
country is assigned a 1.  If a priori review is 
restricted to certain policy areas such as treaties 
then they are assigned a 0.5.  Those countries 
which have only incidental review are coded as 0. 
Constitutional 
Review 
Previous 
Judicial 
Review 
Dummy variable which is used as an independent 
variable which is coded as 1 if there had been 
constitutional review under the previous 
communist regime and 0 if there had been no 
tradition of judicial empowerment.  Since the 
objective of these variables is to measure the 
institutions of each country, it stands to reason that 
a tradition of constitutional review would have an 
impact on the strength of constitutional review in 
the current period. 
Judicial 
Independence 
Judge's term 
relative to 
other political 
actors 
Determined by the relative length of a judicial term 
of office to the terms of other actors in the 
government.  When a constitutional court judge’s 
term is less than or equal to one term of the actor 
with the longest term a 0 is assigned, 0.33 when 
less than or equal to two parliamentary sessions, 
0.66 when more than two parliamentary sessions 
(but had constitutionally specified limit in the 
number of terms), and 1 when the term ends with 
death or voluntary retirement.   
35 
Judicial 
Independence 
How many 
actors are 
involved in 
selection of 
judges 
Number of actors involved in the nomination and 
confirmation process.  Coded as 0 when there was 
only one actor involved in the process, as 0.5 for 
two actors, and as 1 for when three or more 
institutional actors were involved in the process of 
nomination and confirmation. 
Judicial 
Independence 
Who 
establishes 
court 
procedures 
 
Judicial control of judicial procedure; who sets the 
rules which determine the proceedings of court 
cases? Coded as 0 if procedures were established 
outside of the court and as 1 if procedures were 
established by the court itself. 
Judicial 
Independence 
Conditions for 
judicial 
removal 
 
 
 
 
Degree of difficulty in removing judges from 
office.  Country cases received a score of 0 if 
judges may be removed for any reason loosely 
described as violations of the law. Country cases 
were scored a 0.5 if judges may only be removed 
under specific conditions listed under the 
constitution (such as for treason). The case was 
scored a 1 if the constitution either guarantees that 
judges cannot be removed for any reason, or if 
there are no provisions for removal at all. 
 
